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A multivariate analysis of rational and behavioral factors that may explain the existence 
of discounts (premiums) of Closed-end Investment Funds. 
 
 
Abstract 
Using multivariate analysis and based on a theoretical framework that we call hybrid theory 
(which considers rational and behavioral explanations for the close-end investment funds 
discounts/premiums), we intend to test the validity of certain factors such as agency costs, 
dividend policy and liquidity (so-called rational factors), combined with investor sentiment 
and limits to arbitrage (behavioral factors) to explain the structure of closed-end funds 
discounts (premiums) in the US market. Note that, as far as we know, few empirical papers 
have tested the validity of this approach. 
Based on a sample of 346 US closed-end funds, we present evidence that dividend policy 
(dividend yield), the portfolio composition (restricted assets) and turnover ratio, as well as the 
investor sentiment and replication costs (as arbitrage limits) are statistically significant 
variables by the multivariate regression analysis undertaken, which seems to support 
empirically the hybrid hypothesis. 
This paper also intends, by stepwise discriminant analysis, to identify which of these 
explanatory factors of closed-end funds discounts (premiums) contribute most to discriminate 
between bond and equity funds. Results indicate that the dividend yield, management fee and 
replication costs (limits to arbitrage) are the main contributors to the discriminant function, 
with about 92% of the funds properly classified. 
 
Key words: closed-end funds discounts; behavioral theories; investor sentiment; rational 
factors; discriminant analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION.  
For the past few decades that existence and persistence of closed-end investment funds 
discounts (premiums) (which we designate now and then, only by closed-end funds) has 
intrigued academic and professionals, since that seem to defy the principle of markets 
efficiency. Discounts/premiums of closed-end funds result from the difference between the 
market price at which fund shares are traded and its fundamental value, called the Net Asset 
Value (NAV). It should be noted that discounts (i.e., when the NAV is higher than the funds’ 
shares price) has paradoxically been the most common and persistent up to date (Copland, 
2007; Malkiel & Xu, 2005; Gemmill & Thomas, 2002; Dimson & Minio-Koserski, 1999; 
Elton, Gruber & Busse, 1998).  
In an attempt to understand this puzzle have been discussed mainly two theoretical 
frameworks: those who argue that the discounts (premiums) can be explained by the so-called 
rational factors - the rational theory - and those who advocate that these are result from the 
sentiment investor or asymmetric information and arbitrage limits - the behavioral theory. 
The former approach considers that investors are rational and the market is efficient, so the 
discounts (premiums) will be a challenge to these assumptions, pointing to factors (so-called 
rational) as explanations this "anomaly" like the potential tax liability for unrealized capital 
gains, the dividend policy, the fund portfolio composition, the agency costs and performance 
management, among others. The behavioral approach, for its part, seeks to explain the puzzle 
based on behavioral and psychological factors, such as the investor sentiment theory, 
asymmetric information and arbitrage limits (particularly the replication costs). More 
recently, a new set of hypothesis (which we call the hybrid framework or theory) seeks to 
explain this dilemma by combining the so-called rational factors and behavioral factors. In 
our opinion the research of Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Wang (2003a, b) are examples 
of this approach. 
The rational approach (based on factors such as agency costs, potential tax liabilities, 
liquidity, political distribution, etc.), in general, has difficulty to justify the variability of the 
discounts of the funds over time and the existence of premiums, but have some relevance to 
explain the existence and persistence of discounts between funds. The investor sentiment 
theory (especially the individual investor sentiment), although it seems to explain most of the 
pieces of the puzzle, there are researchers that disagree with the tests and methods used to 
validate it, concluding that this is not relevant to the discounts (premiums) explanation,  as 
they found no empirical evidence to corroborate that. Notice that this theory does not seem to 
make sense as explanation of UK closed-end funds discounts (premiums), since these are 
mainly traded among institutional investors and individuals have a small relative expression 
in this market. 
Assuming that the closed-end funds market may imply either rational investors or noise 
traders, institutional and individual, we believe that either rational or behavioral factors may 
be relevant to explain the closed-end funds discounts (premiums). We also observed that 
there are few studies that systematically explore the combination of these assumptions, 
especially in the US market. Accordingly, we use a cross sectional multiple regression, based 
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on a sample of US closed-end funds, to test rational and behavioral factors, simultaneously,  
(like dividend policy, agency costs – as implied by the management fees and management 
expenses), liquidity – as implied by restricted assets and turnover ratio,  investor sentiment 
risk and arbitrage limits) that may explain the discounts (premiums). Highlight that in this 
analysis, we will use as a proxy of investor sentiment not a single indicator (such as the 
weighted average discount, as it has been used by several authors), but a composite index of 
investor sentiment, as proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). This composite investor 
sentiment index combines and reflects the common behavior of various indirect indicators of 
investor sentiment. This composite indicator, to our knowledge, has not been used in the 
analysis of factors that potentially explains the closed-end funds discounts level by other 
authors, as so far. Another objective of this paper is to investigate whether the closed-end 
funds can be distinguished taking into account the potential explanatory variables of the 
structure of closed-end funds discounts (or premiums), giving the most commonly factors 
provided (resulting from the review of the literature) and which best discriminates between 
funds groups. To achieve this objective the multivariate technique of descriptive and 
classificatory discriminant analysis will be applied categorizing funds into two major generic 
groups: equity funds and bond funds. 
The results, based on a sample of 346 US closed-end, between 1994 and 1998, seem to 
support the hybrid approach, verifying that rational factors (such as dividend yield, turnover 
ratio and restricted assets) and behavioral (investor sentiment and replication costs - as limits 
to arbitrage) were considered significant and the model of multiple linear regression showed 
an explanatory power of 64% and 65% respectively for each model tested for the total 
sample. The variables, so-called rational: dividend yield and management fee, and the 
behavioral variable “replication costs” are those that contribute more to the discriminant 
function between the groups of equity and bond funds, while 49% of the variation of the 
discriminant function be explained by the model obtained. 
This paper is then structured as follows: in the following section, we make a brief literature 
review and discuss the theories that seek to justify the existence and persistence of the closed-
end funds discounts (premiums) level to form our theoretical framework. Then, we exposed 
the methodology and describe variables to be used in our empirical research. The fourth 
section describes the sample, present and analyzes the obtained results in the investigation 
and, finally, concludes and points out some suggestions for future research.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.  
In the literature we can identify two dominant sets of hypothesis that seek to explain the 
existence and persistence of closed-end funds discounts (premiums): the rational approach 
and behavioral approach. However, more recently, has emerged another framework, which 
we call hybrid approach, that advocates that the puzzle can be explained by both rational 
factors as behavioral ones. 
Proponents of the rational approach, which prevailed during the 60s to 80s of the twentieth 
century, studied and identified factors such as tax liability on unrealized capital gains and 
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dividend policy, agency costs, including management fees; fund assets turnover ratio and 
liquidity, among others. The authors considered that the policy of dividends distribution and 
tax liabilities on potential unrealized capital gains (e.g.: Malkiel, 1977 and 1995, Anderson & 
Born, 1987, among others) argue that funds that have high unrealized capital gains should sell 
at a discount because investors in these funds will assume tax obligations when those 
earnings are distributed. Thus, when the funds adopt a generous dividend policy, discounts 
(premiums) will tend to decrease (increase). This relationship will be strengthened when 
funds pursue a dividend policy with guaranteed minimum dividend (Wang, 2003a,b; Johnson, 
Lin & Song, 2006). However, this approach does not seem very consistent with some facts 
about the behavior of discounts, especially on IPO and the announcement of an open-ending 
operation as well as the existence of premiums. It is true that some authors obtained some 
statistical significance for these factors using univariate and multivariate analysis (e.g. 
Malkiel, 1977 and 1995; Gemmill & Thomas, 2002), however, this cannot explain why funds 
are usually issued at a premium or low discount and, in general, when the seasoned funds are 
at a premium or low discount. Moreover, this argument seems not have reason to be, given 
the British closed-end funds have discounts with magnitude and behavior identical to the US 
ones1, although they have different tax environment. Lee and Moore (2003), which sought to 
explain the existence of premiums in US closed-end bond funds, supported the hypothesis 
based on preference for dividend yield, assuming that the individual investors, major 
customers of these funds (according to the authors) has shorter investment horizons. 
Therefore, the closed-end bond funds will be more demand than its shares, since the price of 
the shares of those funds are less volatile and pay monthly dividends (while equity funds 
usually only pay annually). This research, although appears to be relevant from the rational 
point of view, it raises some questions relating to assumptions and the results obtained: is that 
closed-end funds have an advantage over mutual funds to attract, in fact, individual investors 
with short investment horizons; the inhibition of high turnover ratio will not be a 
consequence of the fact of closed-end funds shares be less liquid than the ordinary shares of 
others companies, which leads to having higher transaction costs; during the sample period 
(1992 to 1999) the rates were very low, will that results remain in periods when rates are 
higher. Authors were not explicit if they tested multicolinearity of variables and do not show 
the determination coefficients of the models tested. 
The arguments relating to the portfolio composition, liquidity and turnover, the existence of 
restricted assets, generally illiquid assets, and foreign assets may lead to a mispriced NAV 
because the determining of the "fair" value of these assets may be a bit subjective and usually 
based on the principle of conservatism in accounting of these assets (Malkiel, 1977 and 1995; 
Anderson & Born, 1987; and Draper & Paudyal, 1991). Thus, discounts may be a result of 
the existence of these assets in the fund portfolio. However, this bias does not fit with the 
behavior of discounts when funds initiate an open-ending process, as the price converges to 
the NAV and not vice versa, or even the existence of premiums. Some authors examined the 
relationship between liquidity and discounts from the perspective of differential liquidity risk 
                                                                        
1
 
In the UK, closed-end funds cannot distribute any realized capital gain (they must reinvest it in the portfolio) and shareholders of the fund 
are not subject to taxes on capital gains unless they sell their positions on the fund (Dimson & Minio Kozerski , 1999; Dimson & Mini-
Paluello, 2002 and Gemmill & Thomas, 2002).
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between fund shares and its NAV (Datar, 2001 and Jain, Xia & Wu, 2004), whereas the 
discounts increase with fund shares illiquidity and reduce with the underlying portfolio 
liquidity. To study this factor they used proxies such as trading volume and underlying 
volatility. The liquidity of the funds may be a factor, along with others, in explaining cross-
sectional discounts (Datar, 2001). Neal and Wheatley (1998), Clarke and Shastri (2001) and 
Chen, Jiang, Kim and McInish (2003) analyzed the adverse selection component of the bid-
ask spread of closed-end funds in comparison with shares of other firms, suggesting the 
presence of asymmetric information. This should not be evident in closed-end funds 
discounts, theoretically, because there is little uncertainty about the fundamental value of the 
funds, since both price and NAV of the fund are published regularly and publicly available. 
Even considering the nature of this argument, it seems that it does not embraces all facets of 
the closed-end funds discounts puzzle, namely why they are issued at a premium to be 
reduced over time or why there is a convergence of price to NAV. In relation to turnover 
ratio, which is the level of transactions in the fund's portfolio, any purchase or sale of 
securities in the portfolio, more than necessary to maintain the level of profitability and 
diversification, will increase transaction costs and taxes payable without result in better 
performance of the fund. Thus, funds with high turnover will sell at a discount higher than 
those with a lower ratio (Boudreaux, 1973; Malkiel, 1977 and 1995, Anderson & Born, 
1987). However, the authors found no statistically significant evidence in their samples. 
Agency costs, including management fee and expense ratio, has been widely studied or 
applied to samples of US or UK closed-end funds, sometimes with a few variations or 
different approaches (e.g. Malkiel, 1977 and 1995 Draper & Paudyal, 1991, Kumar & 
Noronha, 1992; Deaves & Krinsky, 1994; Baroni-Adesi & Kim, 1999; Ross, 2002; Gemmill 
& Thomas, 2002; Flynn, 2002 or Cherkes, 2003). According to this argument, the higher the 
management costs, especially management fees, higher (lower) the closed-end funds discount 
(premium). In this context was also analyzed the relationship between discounts and agency 
problems arising from the ownership structure of the funds (e.g. Draper & Paudyal, 1991, 
Barclay, Holderness & Pontiff, 1993, Malkiel, 1995, Coles, Suay & Woodbury, 2000; 
Khorana, Wahal & Zenner, 2001, Del Guercio, Dann & Partch, 2003). This argument seems 
to have some economic significance for the explanation of the existence of discounts 
(premiums) in closed-end funds, but even so, still have limitations in some aspects. For 
example, the model of Baroni-Adesi and Kim (1999) cannot explain time series behavior of 
discounts - its volatility and variability over time, or because new funds are issued and are in 
great demand. Even the models suggested by Ross (2002), Flynn (2002) and Cherkes (2003) 
have some difficulty in explaining the variability of discounts over time, although they seem 
to reasonably explain the cross sectional level of discounts. In particular, the model proposed 
by Cherkes (2003) cannot explain the expected decline (increase) of premiums (discounts) 
after the IPO of the fund, while it may explain the co-movement of discounts on related 
funds. Ross (2002) to explain the behavior of IPO discounts assumed the hypothesis of 
asymmetric information between those who issue and sell the fund and investors but also fails 
to explain the behavior after the IPO. 
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Wang (2001a) presented a model that seeks to explain the variation in discounts, over time, 
based on the nature of information flow, whereby variations in the discounts would have to 
reflect the innovations of the fundamental value of the underlying fund assets, i.e. the 
variation in discounts should be able to estimate the fund share returns. However, the Wang 
(2001a) model only considers funds that invest in liquid assets and medium and high market 
capitalization shares, which raises the question whether the model will be compatible with 
funds that invest in restricted assets and bonds. If not, is not possible to generalize this model. 
Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2003) present another factor that may explain at least part of the 
puzzle of closed-end funds discounts, and that meets the rational theory: the information 
asymmetry between investors and fund managers as the risk associated with the fund 
composition that they designated as inventory risk. According to them, discounts may persist 
even if there are taxes and transaction costs dispersive and correlated actions of investors to 
influence the prices of closed-end funds, so the fund NAV should be biased upwards and not 
its price. This argument seems to explain the behavior of discounts in an open-ending 
operation and at its launch on the market (IPO), however, does not seem to justify the reason 
for time series behavior of discounts and its time series variance. 
  
Like Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1990 and 1991) and other critics, we also have questioned 
these theories. It seems that although a few of these arguments have some explanatory power 
on the existence of discounts (sometimes more difficult to justify the premiums), are not 
sufficient to explain their behavior and time series variability. Be noted that some of these 
factors are not mutually exclusive. Given the difficulty of the so-called rational theory to 
explain several aspects of the puzzle of closed-end funds discounts, some authors have cast 
doubts on the rationality of investors, or that at least they have a limited rationality, even 
among those who favored initially more traditional arguments and rational assumption (e.g. 
Bleaney & Smith, 2003 and 2008).  
Proponents of behavioral theory, particularly the investor sentiment theory, have presented 
evidence, sometimes contradictory, on their behalf (e.g.: Chen, Kan & Miller, 1993; Brauer, 
1993, Abraham, Elan & Marcus, 1993; Bordutha, Kim & Lee, 1995; Cheung, Kwan & Lee, 
1997; Neal & Wheatley, 1998, Brown, 1999). This has been widely tested in the country 
funds, especially if the US domestic investor sentiment explain the existence and behavior of 
these country funds discounts or the local market. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) based on 
the model proposed by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) advocated the 
presence of two types of investors in the market: the noise traders and rational investors. The 
former are individual investors who are not as well informed as the institutional ones, often 
relying on the advice of experts to make their investment decisions. The latter are 
institutional investors who make decisions more rational and informed. The random behavior 
and irrational manner of noise traders can lead to an additional risk associated with the price 
of closed-end funds, due to changes in the sentiment, and lead to stronger discounts than 
expected, by inhibiting the actions of rational investors. This argument is justified by the fact 
new funds appear when the markets are already at a premium or                         
lower discount or by the positive correlation between discounts across funds and over time. 
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 However, back in 1973, Zweig had charged that the discounts (premiums) of closed-end 
funds should be due to pessimistic expectations (optimistic) to retail investors, who have 
access to all information regarding the price of the fund, but are not shared by professionals, 
leading to discrepancies between the price of the fund and its NAV. According to Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991), this approach also justifies the correlation between discounts and 
the prices of other assets, including the price low market capitalization shares. Conversely, 
this argument was challenged by Elton, Gruber and Busse (1998) and even by Doukas and 
Milonas (2004) who found no evidence that investor sentiment, since the varying discounts 
on closed-end funds is not a factor measured in the generation of assets return. Brauer (1993) 
to assess the relevance of investor sentiment in the variability of discounts applied to US 
domestic closed-end funds was able to justify just about 7% of its variability. Monte and 
Armada (2008), in a similar study to the Brauer (1993) but considering different time period, 
could justify only 8.6% of the variance of standardized discount. Gemmill and Thomas 
(2002) suggest that variations in discounts are due to changes in (individual) investor 
sentiment, while its existence can be explained by rational factors such as management 
expenses and arbitrage limits. Some researches on the discounts volatility and mean reversion 
suggest investor psychology, or a degree of investor irrationality, as a justification for the 
excessive volatility detected and the fact that some fund discounts may not reverse and even 
further increase (e.g. Pontiff, 1997; Gasbarro, Johnson & Zumwalt, 2003; Agyei-Ampomah 
& Davis, 2005).                                                                                                                                                      
There is, however, a certain incongruity between this theory, assuming that noise traders are 
individual investors, and the facts established in UK closed-end funds discounts, where 
institutional investors have a relatively high weight. As already mentioned previously, there 
is a certain similarity between US and UK funds, in terms of behavior and level.                                                                    
Jackson (2003) questions whether the noise traders are individual or institutional investors, as 
he found no evidence of risk associated with the key participation of the latter on the market. 
Thus, institutional investors might also act as noise traders. Previously, Sias (1996, 1997) 
suggested that the noise trader risk could result from the participation of institutional 
investors in the closed-end funds market. There is also growing research on the influence of 
investor sentiment in the assets return and their volatility and if investor sentiment is different 
among individual and institutional investors (in addition to the authors cited above, see e.g. 
Kelly, 1997; Fisher & Statman, 1999; Wang, 2000; Shefrin, 2000; Wang, 2001b; Lee, Jiang 
& Indro, 2002; Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2003; Baker & Wurgler, 2003, 2006; Brown & 
Cliff, 2004; Verma & Verma, 2007; Mian & Sankaraguruswamy, 2008; among others). 
Also within the behavioral theory have been analyzed the limits of arbitrage and asymmetric 
information that may also give some contribution to the justification of the closed-end funds 
discounts puzzle. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Korki, Nakamura and Turtle (2001) 
considered that the arbitrage costs and other arbitrage limits could explain why discounts 
persists. Pontiff (1996) also found that the arbitrage, by incurring costs associated with the 
fact that market participants may face noise trader risk, see their ability to drive fund prices to 
its fundamental value limited, finding a relationship between discounts and proxies for the 
arbitrage costs. Flynn (2005a, b) also argues that the discounts persist and vary over time as a 
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result of arbitrage limits. He found the presence of noise traders in the US closed-end fund 
market and that the noise trader risk is not diversifiable, thus imposing limits on arbitrage to 
these assets. Grullon and Wang (2001) put the emphasis on asymmetric information accessed 
by investors in closed-end funds but mainly on the quality of information accessed by private 
institutional investors.  
More recently has been coming up a framework which combines rational factors with 
behavioral ones, since both rational and behavioral hypotheses cannot fully explain all the 
pieces of the closed-end funds discount puzzle. According to this framework, there will be 
factors such as dividend policy, management fees and performance or liquidity coupled with 
investor sentiment and arbitrage limits that could justify the existence of discounts 
(premiums) and its behavior along time. Gemmill and Thomas (2002), which can be 
considered as the first to test these assumptions, argue that the discounts (premiums) are the 
result of the dynamic relationship between noise traders and rational arbitrageurs. Thus the 
existence of discounts is a rational phenomenon that depends on the level of management 
fees and arbitrage costs, while its persistence and variability results from the investor 
sentiment (the noise traders). According to Gemmill and Thomas (2002), the behavior of 
discounts over time could be explained by investor sentiment (that is reflected by the retail-
investor flow so that the fluctuation in the discount results from variation in small investors’ 
sentiment, both short term and the long term. Also Wang (2003a, b) argues that many factors, 
whether rational or behavioral, may contribute to the existence and persistence of discounts. 
They examined factors such as agency costs, potential tax liability, the investor sentiment 
theory and arbitrage costs. According to them, the closed-end funds managers use the 
dividend policy and share repurchases as a means of reducing the discounts. It also argues 
that a dividend policy of distributing a minimum level of dividends makes that the fund can 
reduce the potential tax liability for its investors and the arbitrage costs imposed on 
arbitrageurs as well as reduce the exposure to investor sentiment risk. Wang (2003a, b) also 
found that a target distribution policy, which guarantees a minimum level of dividends to 
ordinary shareholders, helped to explain the variation between funds on the discounts level by 
reducing the total net assets. Johnson, Lin and Song (2006), as previous authors, even though 
they give emphasis to the role of guaranteed dividend policy, they do not exclude the 
hypothesis that there are rational and behavioral factors that may explain the existence and 
persistence of discounts closed-end funds.  
In the following section, giving this theoretical framework, we describe the methodology and 
assumptions to be tested and define the variables. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES.  
As we noticed in previous section, different hypothesis were presented to explain the 
existence and persistence of discounts and other associated anomalies but they are not 
unanimous and conclusive, and none of the hypotheses advanced alone can cover all the 
pieces of puzzle. In this way, we believe that the combination of rational factors with 
behavioral ones can make a better contribution to the clarification of this "anomaly" (namely 
the dividend policy; the portfolio composition and the differential liquidity between funds 
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shares and underlying portfolio; the agency costs - measured by management expenses or 
management fee; the asymmetry of information and limitations of arbitration as well as 
investor sentiment).  
Thus, based on the hybrid theoretical framework2, but not using a particular model, we will 
analyze the relationship between the funds discounts and a number of factors that have been 
reported in the literature as relevant to explain these phenomena, specifically: dividend 
policy, agency costs, composition/ liquidity of the fund's portfolio, turnover ratio, investor 
sentiment risk and limits to arbitrage. It will also be considered, as controlling factors, the 
fund size and its age (since it could potentially affect the discount). It is expected, however, 
they do not show significant impacts. Table A.1 in the annex summarizes the hypotheses 
under research, for each factor analyzed. 
In this way, we will apply a multiple linear regression where all the factors under 
investigation are considered together, not forgetting the issues of multicolinearity. The 
generic model to consider is the following:  
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii AGEhSIZEgCAfSIeLIQdDRcACbaDisc ε++++++++=     (3.1)  
Where, 
- iDisc - represents the average discount in the analyzed period, to the fund i;  
- iAC - corresponds to the factors related to agency costs or management;  
- iDR - represents the dividend policy;  
- iLIQ - represents the factors related to the composition/liquidity of the fund's portfolio and 
turnover ratio;  
- iSI - corresponds to the factors related to investor sentiment;  
- iCA - is related to the arbitrage costs and the difficulty of replication of funds; 
- iSIZE  and iAGE  represents, respectively, the control variables: size and age of the fund.  
 
The average discount during the analyzed period ( iDisc ) is calculated as the arithmetic mean 
of the recorded discounts during the period under analysis, for each fund, and the discount (
tiD , ) calculated from the spread between market price and NAV, compared to NAV3:  
  100
,
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×
−
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D   (3.2)  
where,  
tiP , ≡   Market price of the shares of closed-end fund i, in period t.  
                                                                        
2 Following the hybrid approach, it is considered that in the market can find non homogeneous investors in relation to access and how they 
interpret the information linked on the market. So, there are informed investors, noise traders and investors who act on the basis of liquidity 
needs. These investors, as a rule, are risk averse, but have different levels of aversion. 
3
 Notice, for instance, that the website of the Association of Investment Funds Closed (www.cefa.org), which contains information on the 
discount/premium of US closed-end fund, calculates discounts by this formula.
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tiV , ≡   Net asset value of closed-end fund i, in period t.  
So, if tiD , > 0, the fund is at a premium; if tiD , <0, the fund is at a discount. 
In relation to agency or management costs factor - iAC  - will be used proxies for the 
variables "management expenses” ( iDg ), which is calculated by total expenditure 
management, which includes the management fee paid to fund managers, in relation to total 
net assets (NAV) of the fund, and "management fee" ( iMf ) charged by the fund manager that 
is expressed as a percentage of total net assets. 
The dividend policy factor - iDR - will be employed, as proxies, the "Dividend yield" ( iDy ), 
which is the percentage of dividends paid by the fund in relation to total net assets in the 
portfolio; and the "Capital gains distributed" ( iGc ), which corresponds to the percentage of 
realized capital gains distributed by the fund in relation to total net assets in the portfolio.  
For Composition and liquidity of the fund's portfolio and turnover ratio factor -
iLIQ - will be 
used by a proxy for restricted assets ( iAr ), a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for 
funds that invest in assets generally considered as illiquid such as municipal bonds, foreign 
assets and other securities like convertible; and 0 for the remaining funds. The turnover ratio (
iTurn ) denotes the degree of rotation of the assets in the fund portfolio, corresponding to the 
ratio between the value of acquired assets deducted from assets sold, by quarter, and the 
average value of portfolio assets held in this period, in percentage. 
As investor sentiment variable, since is not a variable directly observable and objective, have 
been used by various authors, different proxies, but usually only considering a single 
indicator. One of the most commonly used proxies for investor sentiment have been average 
discounts (premiums) of domestic closed-end funds (e.g. Elton, Gruber & Busse, 1998; Neal 
& Wheatley, 1998; Sias, Starks & Tinic, 2001; Gemmil & Thomas, 2002; Doukas & 
Milonas, 2004, among others). However, other proxies have been used instead, such as 
indicators measured by the survey investors, consumers and financial analysts, such as the 
AAII Sentiment Survey Index, sentiment index developed by surveys to members of the 
American Association of Individual Investors (Brown, 1999), the Investors Intelligence 
Index, which gathers the opinions of financial analysts (Lee, Jiang & Indro, 2002), or the 
index on consumer confidence, as the University Michigan Consumer Confidence Index 
(Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2004; Qiu & Welch, 2004). These are direct indicators of investor 
sentiment to the extent that is the result of questionnaires, in which, however does not fully 
reflect investor sentiment, as investors may respond that they are optimistic or pessimistic 
about market behavior but their actions in the market might point to another direction. Other 
proxies used (individually) as indicators of investor sentiment have been, for example, the 
relative weight of equity in new issues (Baker & Wurgler, 2000), the buy and sell imbalance 
(Kumar & Lee, 2003; Kaniel, Saar & Titman, 2004), or the net flow of mutual funds - net 
new cash flow of equity mutual funds (Gemmill & Thomas, 2002; Brown, Goetzmann, 
Hiraki, Shiraishi & Watanabe, 2003; Frazzini & Lamont, 2006) or trading volume trend 
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(Johnson, Lei, Lin & Sanger, 2005, 2007). Brown and Cliff (2005), Glushkov (2006) and 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) proposed the use of an index of investor sentiment taken from the 
combination of several proxies of investor sentiment. In our point of view, the advantage of 
using these composite indexes, and not just a single indicator, is the fact that, by combining 
direct and indirect indicators, allows that the relative power of each component varies over 
time.  
In this study we choose to use the Composite Index of Investor Sentiment ( itICSI ) proposed 
by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which is accessible on the website of the authors 
(http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/)4. This is based on the common variation of six 
underlying proxies of investor sentiment: the domestic discounts of closed-end investment 
funds, the NYSE shares turnover, the number and the average first day return on IPO, share 
of equity issues in total equity and debt issues and the dividend premium, which is calculated 
as the log difference of the average market-to-book ratios of payers (companies that pay 
dividends) and non-payers. They used the principal component analysis to isolate the 
common component of each of these six proxies. In constructing the index had also note that 
there are variables that may reflect changes in investor sentiment earlier (or later) than others, 
therefore examined whether each set should be integrated with lead or lag. Moreover, as these 
variables may also be influenced by macroeconomic conditions and business cycles, they 
orthogonalized proxy variables (gross) of investor sentiment for the following variables: the 
growth rate of industrial production (Federal Reserve Statistical Release G .17), the growth in 
consumption of durable goods, nondurable goods and services (BEA National Income 
Account, Table 2.10), and a dummy variable for recessions of the NBER (National Bureau of 
Economic Research).  
So as a factor "investor sentiment - iSI ", we will consider the sensitivity of fund discounts to 
Composite Index of Investor Sentiment - proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Thus,
 
titiSI ,, β=  (3.3), where the beta is calculated using the linear regression by the ordinary least 
squares method:  
tittititi ICSID ,,,, εβα ++=     (3.4)  
As a proxy of the "arbitrage costs and the difficulty of replication of funds" - iCA - will be 
used the variable "replication cost" ( tiCR , ) which represents a limits to arbitrage on the fund, 
and that can be measured, as suggested by Gemmill and Thomas (2000), by the variance of 
the residual error of the following linear regression:  
 ititititit RmRV εβα ++=       (3.5)  
Being,  
≡itRV  the NAV return of the fund i, at time t.  
≡itRm   the market return of the fund i,  at time t. For domestic equity funds it will be used 
the market return calculated by Fama and French (1993) and reported in the Webpage 
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The authors allowed us to apply it in this work, for which we thank both, and in particular to Professor Wurgler.
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K. French. For bond funds and other taxable fixed-income securities, the Lehman 
Brothers Corporate A + index. For municipal bonds funds, we use the Lehman 
Brothers U.S. Municipal Index. For international equity funds, we applied the MSCI 
World Index.  
≡itε  Random error term.  
Regarding the control variables "Age - iAGE " and "Size - iSIZE ", were defined as the 
logarithm of the fund age since its inception by the end of the period, in years, and the 
logarithm of the market capitalization value of the fund, in every moment, respectively.  
 
As another objective of this research is to investigate the explaining factors of the closed-end 
fund discounts, said rational and behavioral (that were discussed earlier), that differentiate 
better the several categories of closed-end funds existing in the U.S. market, and we applied 
the stepwise discriminant analysis using Wilks’Lambda method. This is a multivariate 
statistical technique for identifying variables that differentiate two or more groups of 
individuals structurally different and mutually exclusive, which begins with no variables in 
the following steps and variables are added or removed as its contribution to the 
discriminating capacity of first discriminant function (Maroco, 2007). It should be noted that 
the Wilks’ Lambda statistic is only valid if the sample comes from a multivariate normal 
population with homogeneous variance-covariance matrix for each group. Another condition 
is that none of the variables can be linear combination of other, i.e. cannot be multicollinear 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998; Pestana & Gageiro, 2003; Maroco, 2007). Most 
statistical software provides statistical M-Box test for homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrix, but this statistic is very sensitive to sample size, as large samples usually lead to 
rejection of null hypothesis, even though the difference between the variances-covariances 
matrix are very small. Nevertheless, according to Maroco (2007), this technique is very 
robust to assumptions violations since the size of the smallest group is greater than the 
number of variables under analysis and the groups’ mean are not proportional to their 
variances. The Wilks’ Lambda was used to test the significance of discriminant functions as 
whole and if it significantly discriminate groups. This test applies to all the discriminant 
functions simultaneously and the rejection of null hypothesis5 indicates that at least the first 
discriminant function is significant (the other may or may not be) and conclude the model is 
discriminating (Maroco, 2007).  
In the next section we proceed to sample characterization and analysis of results. 
 
 
 
                                                                        
5
 
The null hypothesis is ( ) ( ) klijklij lkjiHvsH µµµµ ≠∃= :,;,:: 10 , com ki ≠  e mki ,...,1, =  ; lj ≠  e 
glj ,...,1, = , i.e., tests whether the average of all m discriminant functions for each of g groups are equal or there is at least one 
different. 
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4. SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS.  
4.1 Description of the sample.  
For this research we collected a sample of US listed closed-end funds from the 
CDA/Wiesenberger – a Thomson Financial Company database, during the period of January 
1, 1994 to December 31, 19986, including funds with at least 300 weekly observations, both 
market price and its NPV, during this period. Those funds that had more than 1% of total 
observations missing data in the series time series of discounts, market price and NAV were 
excluded. The final sample represents 346 US closed-end funds from the following general 
categories7: equity funds (diversified and specialized), bond funds (fund fixed income subject 
to tax - taxable income funds), municipal funds and international funds (either global or 
specialized countries or geographical regions) - see Table A.2 in the annex. For each fund in 
the sample we collected the following information, with weekly observations: the net asset 
value, market price (fund price), discounts, return on net asset value and market price, in 
percentage, corrected for the dividend distribution and stock splits. Other information 
collected by fund, was the ratio of management expenses and management fees, the turnover 
fund's ratio, the fund total net assets, the fund market capitalization value, the value of total 
dividends distributed (income and capital gains) by the fund. Notice that, since 1997, ceases 
to be registered in the database of CDA/Weisenberger information on the management fees 
and the management expenses begin to be recorded since 1996. 
 
Figure 4.1 - The average discount of closed-end funds during the period 1/01/1994 to 31/12/1998. 
Our sample of 346 US funds traded on the NYSE and AMEX, represents 52% of all funds 
contained in the database, and the most closed-end funds are classified as fixed income funds 
and Municipal Bonds. About 22% of these are international or global funds and only 5.4% 
are domestic equity funds and diversified funds (see Table A.2. in annex). During the period 
from 1/01/1994 to 31/12/1998, were placed on the 118 funds and became extinct (they open-
ending) 31 funds. Analyzing the behavior of fund discounts, based on the average discount of 
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For budget constraints reasons we were unable to extend the sample to a more recent period and include more variables. However, we 
think that the use of historical data does not invalidate the conclusions reached by itself, especially since it is not our primary objective with 
this research to develop a predictive model.
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We excluded from this research, the Dual-purpose funds- also known as "Split-capital funds" - and the Real Estate Investment Trust Funds 
(REIT), due to their peculiar characteristics.
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the funds in the database shows that on average closed-end funds have traded at a discount 
during this period8 (see Figure 4.1, above). 
 
4.2. Multivariate analysis of factors that explain the closed-end funds discounts.  
As was pointed out in Section 3, to examine the joint relation between the rational and 
behavioral factors to explain closed-end funds discounts, their common structure between 
funds and along time, we applied multiple linear regressions, considering the average values 
each of the variables (dependent and explanatory) in the five-year period. As for the agency 
costs factor we use two proxies that may be multicollinear, we estimate the linear regression 
(according to equation 3.1) considering two models, separately: model 1- management fee as 
proxy for agency costs; model 2 – management expenses as proxy for agency costs.  
The assumptions of the model of multiple linear regression (i.e., the normal distribution, 
homogeneity and independence of errors) were validated graphically and analyzed the 
residuals through the statistics of Durbin-Watson, in the case of independence. In order to 
eliminate possible outliers, we make the analysis of studentized residuals9 testing the 
hypothesis H0:
 
01 =−= −jjj εε∆  vs. H1: 0≠j∆ . That is, compare the value of tj with the 
critical value of t-student distribution with (np-1) degrees of freedom: 
jjj
j
j hs
e
t
−
=
−
1
, with 
1
1
)(
2
−−
−
−−
=
− pn
h
e
SMEpn
s
jj
j
j
, where SME corresponds to a sample estimate of error standard 
deviation; hjj is the diagonal element of the matrix H = (X 'X)-1X', ej is the error for 
observation j, n is the number of observations and p the number of regressors (Maroco, 
2007:585). If ( )1;21 −−−≥ pnj tt α , we reject H0 for observation j and conclude that xij is a 
multivariate outlier (Maroco, 2007:586). In practical terms, we do not reject H0, taking the 
significance level of 5%, if the value of each studentized residual, calculated by SPSS - v.16 
(SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL ), has a p-value less than or equal to the level of significance, giving 
the statistical test mentioned above. 
To test the multicollinearity assumption, we used the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
According to Maroco (2007:603), VIF values greater than 5 or even 10 indicate problems in 
the estimation due to the presence of multicollinearity in the independent variables.  
Table 4.1 presents the results of multiple linear regressions, on Panel A, the Model 1 - the 
management fee and on Panel B, the Model 2 - management expenses, respectively, based on 
the equation 3.1. To avoid heteroscedasticity problems, a multiple linear regression was 
applied using the weighted least squares method (Weighted Least Squares Regressions), 
using the discount volatility as a weighting factor.  
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Taking into account the empirical research made by other authors, namely by Brauer (1984) and Peavy (1990), we made two adjustments 
in the time-series of the variables discount, NAV and price in the sample. Hence, the first 24 observations were not considered (equivalent to 
six months) after the fund IPO date and those observations of the previous six months to the open-ending operation announcement date. 
9
 
Also known as
 
PRESS (Predicted Sum of Squares) residual or Studentized deleted Residual.
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Table 4.1: Summary of regression analysis (Equation 3.1) in the period 1994-98  
Panel A - Model 1: WLS Regression, with management fee proxy for agency costs  
 
Panel B - Model 2: WLS Regression, with management expenses proxy for agency costs 
 
Where, 
Dy - Dividend yield; Cg - Capital Gains; Dg - Management Expenses; Turn - Turnover; Ar - Restricted Assets; SI - investor sentiment, 
measured by the beta coefficient (as a result of the application of eq. 3.4), Cr - replication cost, measured by the residual variance of eq. 3.5, 
as suggested by Gemmill and Thomas (2002), Age - Age, measured by the logarithm of fund age; Size - size, measured by the logarithm of 
fund market capitalization, during the analyzed period; VIF - Variance Inflation Factor; SE.reg. - Standard error of Regression; SSRes. - 
Sum of squared residuals; DW - Durbin-Watson Statistics, F-stat. – F-statistic with F-Snedecor distribution with p and (np-1) degrees of 
freedom; # obs. - Number of observations.  
Analyzing the results shown in Table 4.1 (Panel A and B), we observe that the variables: 
dividend yield (Dy), the proxy for dividend policy, have positive regression coefficient (as 
expected) and are statistically significant to a significance level (s.l.) of 5% in any of the 
models considered. The turnover ratio is also statistically significant, with a s.l. of 5% and a 
negative coefficient (as expected) in any of the models considered. Surprisingly, the variable 
"restricted assets" (Ar) showed positive and statistically significant, in general, that not allow 
us to validate the hypothesis H3, indicating that the illiquidity of the underlying assets in the 
fund's portfolio helps to reduce the discount, which do not seems "reasonable" of rational 
point of view. This seems to contradict the assumption of those authors that defends the 
preference for liquidity hypothesis as explanation of closed-end fund discounts10.  
Regarding the variables, investor sentiment and replication cost, are statistically significant, 
in any model considered, but the sign of the coefficients is contrary to the expected 
(according to the hypothesis formulated, respectively, H5 and H6). Note that for the 
calculation of the variable “replication cost”, as described in Section 3, we used linear 
regressions of fund's return NAV on the fund market return, considering for that market 
indexes more specific to different categories of closed-end funds, in accordance with its 
investment policy11. These results seem to indicate that these factors will be relevant to 
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These results may perhaps be justified by how it was built (and set) the variable and lack of using a better proxy for measuring the 
liquidity of funds, such as Bid-ask spread or trading volume of fund or other. 
11
 
Interestingly to note is that some of the funds that are classified as bonds (or fixed income securities) or by Wiesenberger or currently by 
Lipper, Inc., had very low coefficients of determination when it was considered a bond market index return. This result raised suspicion that, 
eventually, these funds were misclassified, which was confirmed when we analyzed the composition of the fund's portfolio over time. We 
observed that funds had changed their investment strategy, reducing the weight of investment in bonds to stocks and other assets but 
Explanatory 
Variable C0 Dy Cg Mf Turn Ar SI Cr Size Age
 Coef. -28,845 1,844 0,017 1,252 -0,016 4,886 0,310 1,466 -0,211 2,517
t-stat -7,041 20,011 1,715 1,265 -3,774 7,894 6,064 6,861 -0,792 4,603
(p-value ) 0,000 0,000 0,087 0,207 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,429 0,000
VIF 1,935 1,167 1,620 1,584 2,209 1,700 1,811 1,079 1,446
0,643 F-stat 58,655 0,000
SE.reg 27382,2 DW 1,954
SSRes 14471,9 # Obs 288
2R
Explanatory 
Variable C0 Dy Cg Dg Turn Ar SI Cr Size Age
 Coef. -25,684 1,802 0,018 -0,490 -0,015 4,694 0,234 1,445 -0,174 2,089
t-stat -6,026 20,631 1,769 -1,417 -3,646 6,876 4,018 6,632 -0,643 3,585
(p-value ) 0,000 0,000 0,078 0,158 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,521 0,000
VIF 1,750 1,167 1,437 1,514 2,667 1,917 1,892 1,094 1,652
0,645 F-stat 58,555 0,000
SE.reg 27143,8 DW 1,915
SSRes 14215,8 # Obs 285
2R
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explain the level of discounts but, unexpectedly, their relationship with the level of discounts 
will be opposite to the assumption. 
Given the quality of models fit ( 2R ) presented, the variable "management expenses" seems to 
be a better indicator of the relationship between discounts and agency costs. This variable has 
a negative coefficient, as expected in H2, but no statistically significance (at s.l. 5%). Thus, 
the results show that the rational factors: dividend policy, agency costs and liquidity will be 
relevant to justify the discount rate, its cross-sectional structure. As for behavioral factors, the 
results suggest that these may be relevant to the explanation of discounts, going against the 
results obtained by other researchers as Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Wang (2003a,b) as 
well as Monte and Armada (2007, 2008) and Monte (2008). 
In the next section we analyze if the structure of explanatory factors of discounts, as a whole, 
differs according to the category of funds, taking into account the general classification 
according to the portfolio composition in equity funds and bond funds. 
4.3. Multivariate analysis of explanatory factors of the closed-end funds discounts, by funds 
category.  
To make this analysis we divided the sample into equity funds and bond funds. In the first 
group were included all funds that invest primarily in US domestic equity securities (also 
known as domestic funds) or in shares of companies from other countries, specialized or 
diversified. In the second group was considered funds that invest in corporate bonds or other 
fixed income securities including those that invest in bonds issued by governments and 
regional and federal entities (known as Munibond funds). Similar to the previous analysis, for 
the total sample for the 1994-98 period, we used multiple linear regressions with the 
weighted least squares method (using as a weighting factor the volatility of funds' discounts). 
It was also considered two models of regression equation because proxies of agency costs can 
be highly collinear. The assumptions of the model of multiple linear regressions, namely the 
normal distribution, homogeneity and independence of errors were tested. The first two 
assumptions were validated graphically and independence has been validated with the 
statistic Durbin-Watson, as said previously. To detect possible multicollinearity problems we 
used the VIF and eliminate the outliers’ observations we applied the same procedure 
described above. The table below shows the results for these regressions for each type of 
funds, by general category as given by funds investment policy (bonds and equity funds).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
continued to be classified as bonds (fixed income). In such cases, because the coefficient of determination was higher and taking into 
account the portfolio composition, we considered the linear regression not with a bond index but with a stock index return.
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Table 4.2: Summary of multiple linear regressions (Equation 3.1) in the period 1994-98, by 
fund category 
Panel A - Model 1: WLS Regression, with management fee variable as proxy for agency cost.  
Panel B - Model 2: WLS Regression, with management expenses variable as proxy for 
agency cost.  
 
Where, 
Dy - Dividend yield; Cg - Capital Gains; Dg - Management Expenses; Turn - Turnover; Ar - Restricted Assets; SI - investor sentiment, 
measured by the beta coefficient (as a result of the application of eq. 3.4), Cr - replication cost, measured by the residual variance of eq. 3.5, 
as suggested by Gemmill and Thomas (2002), Age - Age, measured by the logarithm of fund age; Size - size, measured by the logarithm of 
fund market capitalization, during the analyzed period; VIF - Variance Inflation Factor; SE.reg. - Standard error of Regression; SSRes. - 
Sum of squared residuals; DW - Durbin-Watson Statistics, F-stat. – F-statistic with F-Snedecor distribution with p and (np-1) degrees of 
freedom; # obs. - Number of observations.  
An analysis of the previous table (panel A and B), it appears that, for bond funds, dividend 
yield variable, a proxy of dividend policy, liquidity (as measured by the variable "restricted 
assets") and the behavioral variable "investor sentiment" are statistically significant, although 
not always with the sign as provided in the assumptions made in Section 3, and consequently 
these hypotheses (respectively, H1, H3 and H5) seem to be validated by any of the models 
under discussion. The agency costs variable, as measured by "management expenses" proxy 
(model 2) is statistically significant and has a negative sign as provided in the formulation of 
Fund 
category
Explanatory 
Var. C0 Dy Cg Mf Turn Ar SI Cr Size Age
 Coef. -31,593 2,136 0,097 1,924 -0,013 5,948 0,409 0,394 -0,315 2,710
t-stat -7,303 13,036 0,982 1,311 -3,196 8,464 6,808 0,933 -1,199 4,172
(p-value ) 0,000 0,000 0,327 0,191 0,002 0,000 0,000 0,352 0,232 0,000
VIF 2,777 1,449 1,221 1,678 2,525 1,394 1,920 1,044 1,458
0,583 F-stat 37,619 0,000
SE.reg 15064,8 DW 1,930
SSRes 10100,6 # Obs 236
 Coef. -39,094 2,023 0,004 3,407 0,000 0,774 0,014 1,859 1,205 1,187
t-stat -3,883 7,981 0,309 1,597 0,008 0,589 0,149 6,248 1,396 0,974
(p-value ) 0,000 0,000 0,759 0,118 0,993 0,559 0,882 0,000 0,170 0,336
VIF 3,784 1,909 3,283 2,256 2,465 2,165 1,832 1,534 2,668
0,744 F-stat 16,863 0,000
SE.reg 7343,1 DW 2,004
SSRes 1935,4 # Obs 49
Bonds
Equity
2R
2R
Fund 
category
Explanatory 
Var. C0 Dy Cg Dg Turn Ar SI Cr Size Age
 Coef. -32,203 2,257 0,143 -0,012 -0,101 6,521 0,305 0,083 -0,224 2,617
t-stat -6,644 13,825 1,453 -2,976 -0,286 7,928 4,050 0,187 -0,826 3,705
(p-value ) 0,000 0,000 0,148 0,003 0,775 0,000 0,000 0,852 0,410 0,000
VIF 2,729 1,430 1,609 1,510 3,394 1,643 2,103 1,075 1,719
0,584 F-stat 37,277 0,000
SE.reg 14923,7 DW 1,895
SSRes 9964,1 # Obs 233
 Coef. -29,958 1,774 0,000 0,009 0,248 0,611 0,048 1,827 1,038 0,296
t-stat -2,747 7,616 -0,010 0,417 0,133 0,438 0,464 5,728 1,169 0,222
(p-value ) 0,009 0,000 0,992 0,679 0,895 0,664 0,645 0,000 0,249 0,825
VIF 3,005 2,054 2,351 4,278 2,611 2,384 1,979 1,527 3,003
0,728 F-stat 15,595 0,000
SE.reg 7220,7 DW 2,078
SSRes 2057,9 # Obs 49
Bonds
Equity
2R
2R
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H2. The variable "Turnover" is also statistically significant and negative, as expected, for the 
bond funds (Model 1).  
For equity funds, the variable "dividend yield" (proxy of dividend policy) is statistically 
significant and signed in the same direction as postulated in the hypotheses in Section 3 
(hypothesis H1). So these seem to be validated by any models considered and the behavioral 
variable "replication cost” does not display, though, the coefficient sign as expected. The 
remaining variables are not statistically significant in any of the analyzed models.  
Comparing the two models, and each group of funds, it seems to us that model 2 (which 
consider management expenses as a proxy for agency cost) is that better explains the 
structure of the discounts level for bond funds, while for the equity funds model 1 (with 
agency costs represented by the management fee) seems to be the best, given the 
determination coefficient ( R2 ). Having regard to the above, it seems that there is slight 
difference between the factors that may explain the existence of discounts in bond funds and 
equity funds. For the former, dividend policy, agency costs (measured by management 
expenses), liquidity/portfolio composition and the behavioral factors, including investor 
sentiment, seems to be the most significant factors. For equity funds, the variables of 
dividend policy (measured by dividend yield) and replication cost (limits to arbitrage) are the 
most significant. 
4.4. Rational and behavioral factors that explain closed-end funds discounts, by discriminant 
analysis.  
Since it was found in the previous subsection that, upon the closed-end funds category, 
closed-end funds discounts may be explained by different factors, i.e., the explaining factors 
structure of discounts varies according to whether the equity funds or bond funds. In this 
point, we investigate, using discriminant analysis, which potentially explanatory factors of 
discounts may discriminate equity funds of bond funds. The assumptions of discriminant 
analysis (normality, linearity and multicollinearity) were initially tested, as well as the 
assumption of homogeneity of the variance-covariance matrix for all groups. With the 
exception of variable size, all other variables reject the null hypothesis of normality of their 
distributions12. The M-Box test rejects the hypothesis of homogeneous variance-covariance 
matrix. This rejection may be due to the fact that some variables do not follow the normal 
distribution even after transformation of variables. It should be noted that Maroco (2007) also 
mentions that the discriminant analysis is quite robust to assumptions violations since the size 
of the smallest group is greater than the number of variables under investigation and the 
groups mean are not proportional to their variance, as stated Section 3. This is what we have 
in our sample data. However, as suggested by Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1998), 
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Eisenbeis (1977) states that economic and financial data often do not have normal distributions (even transforming the variables). He 
argues that we can proceed with discriminant analysis relaxing this assumption but taking into account that the tests have less predictive 
power. 
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since there is high discrepancy between the groups size, we proceed with discriminant 
analysis making the appropriate adjustments in the level of significance13.  
According to the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of the equity funds group, 
which is the smallest group, it has higher variance and therefore we consider significance 
levels above 5%. Given the test of equality of means between groups, the dividend yield, 
capital gains, management fees, investor sentiment, replication cost and age have significant 
differences in means between groups.  
By application of the stepwise procedure, using as a criterion for variable selection method of 
the Wilks’ Lambda, by the SPSS software (v. 16, SPSS Inc, Chicago, IL), we obtained a 
discriminant function as we have under analysis only two groups. The standardized canonical 
and unstandardized discriminant coefficients are presented in the following table. 
Table 4.3: Coefficients of the discriminant function (canonical) extracted  
 
Where: Dy - Dividend yield; Turn - Turnover; Mf - Management fee; Ar - Restricted Assets; Cr - replication cost, as measured by the 
residual variance of eq. 3.5, as suggested by Gemmill and Thomas (2002); Age – fund’s age, measured by the logarithm of age of the fund 
during the analyzed period; Const. - Constant. 
As can be seen in the previous table, the variables dividend yield, turnover, management fee, 
restricted assets, replication costs and age are significantly discriminating funds, according to 
their category. The discriminant function has a canonical correlation of 0.7 and is highly 
significant. Since the squared canonical correlation indicates the proportion of discriminant 
function variance is explained by the groups (Pestana & Gageiro, 2003), 49% of the 
discriminant function variance is explained by the groups. Yet, as our aim is to identify the 
variables that contribute most to discriminate the funds under its generic category, we must 
analyze the structure matrix that highlights the contribution of each variable to the 
discriminant function, as it can be observed in the Table 4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                        
13
 
Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1998:348) suggest that when the homoscedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix persists, even 
after carrying out variables transformations and there is a marked discrepancy between the groups size (a difference of more than 1,5) 
adjustments should be made to its effects. First you must analyze which group has higher variance, using the determinant of the variance-
covariance matrix. If the highest variance is recorded in the larger group, the differences should be analyzed using a lower significance level 
(e.g. 3% instead of the normal 5%), if the variance is higher in the smaller group, a higher alpha should be used. 
Variable standardized unstandardized
Dy ,799 ,353
Turn ,212 ,003
Mf -,467 -2,261
Ar ,574 1,167
Cr -,432 -,520
Age -,242 -,510
Const ,809
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Table 4.4: Matrix structure  
 
a. This variable was not used in the analysis. 
Where: Dy - Dividend yield; Cg - Capital Gains; Mf - Management fee; Dg - Management Expenses; Turn - Turnover; Ar - Restricted 
Assets; SI - investor sentiment, measured by the beta coefficient (as a result of the implementation of eq. 3.4); Cr - replication cost, 
measured by the residual variance of eq. 3.5, as suggested by Gemmill and Thomas (2002); Age – fund age, measured by the logarithm of 
fund age, in the analyzed period; Size – fund size, measured by the logarithm of fund market capitalization during the analyzed period.  
 
The variables that contribute most to the discriminant function (identified with the asterisk 
symbol) are dividend yield, management fee and replication cost. The classificatory 
discriminant function (Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Function) is as follows:  
 Age. Cr.- Ar. Mf. Turn. Dy.. -G (bonds) 320353221959294633305507223481112 +++++=
 Age. Cr .  Ar .Mf .  Turn .  Dy .  . - G (equity) 628360110969262573904608182684116 ++++++=
   
The following table (Table 4.5) presents the classification statistics, noticing that the 
percentage of funds classified correctly with the original classification was 91.6%.  
Table 4.5: classification results  
 
These results, while keeping in mind that we are not directly examining the relationship 
between the factors that potentially explain the closed-end funds discounts, seems to support 
is the difference in the explanatory factors structure found in the previous subsection when 
we examined whether there was difference among funds as they were classified as equity or 
bonds funds. It should be noted that we cannot compare the results obtained in the 
discriminant analysis with those of other research, as far as we know so far, this technique 
had not been used by other researchers or empirical researches in the classification of closed-
end investment funds. 
Variable Function loadings
Dy 0,568*
Mf -0,484*
Cr -0,461*
Sia 0,291
Age -0,233
Cga -0,229
Dga -0,159
Ar 0,101
Turn 0,033
Sizea 0,014
Bond Equity Total
Bond 227 10 237
Equity 14 36 50
Ungrouped 
cases
1 1 2
Bond 95,8 4,2 100
Equity 28 72 100
Ungrouped 
cases
50 50 100
Group
Predicted Group Membership
Or
ig
in
a
l
Count
%
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5. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.  
The issue of closed-end investment funds discounts (premiums), although a subject widely 
studied and discussed by academia and industry, continues to cause perplexity and further 
research. To explain its existence and persistence some theoretical models and approaches 
have been emerged. Those theories and approach based on so-called rational factors (such as 
the dividend policy, agency costs, liquidity, performance management, among others) are the 
most advocated ones as well as those based on behavioral factors (like the investor sentiment 
theory, the asymmetric information and arbitrage limits).  
The rational theories (and variants) seem to be able to explain (not completely) the existence 
of discounts, but not always the existence of premiums or its behavior at an IPO or an open-
ending operation. However, there are some so-called rational factors that seem to have some 
economic and statistical significance in explaining the behavior cross sectional discounts 
(premiums). These factors are: the characteristics of the fund’s portfolio (the existence of 
restricted assets, illiquid or foreign), the dividend policy (distribution of dividends and 
unrealized capital gains), and the agency costs (as we could see from the literature review 
presented in section 2).  
The second theoretical framework, especially the investor sentiment theory, seems to fit 
nearly every aspect of the puzzle, looking not only explain the existence of discounts but also 
premiums and their behavior across funds and over time. The investor sentiment theory is 
based on the notion of rational and informed investors versus poorly informed and irrational 
investors (the noise traders) and how this type of investors affects asset prices. The noise 
traders risk results from the optimistic or pessimistic reaction of noise traders that makes 
unpredictable the resale price of assets. It may limit the activities of arbitrageurs since noise 
traders’ opinion can change (or to become even more extreme) during the arbitrage strategies 
implementation period by rational investors, thus imposing an additional risk. As a result, 
closed-end funds should, on average, sell at a discount to compensate for the associated noise 
traders risk, according to this argument. However, some researchers have criticized and found 
no explicit and precise empirical evidence, especially as investor sentiment is an 
unobservable variable that is inevitable the use of proxies. More recently a latest framework 
emerged that we call the hybrid framework, combines rational and behavioral factors to 
explain the puzzle (see Gemmill & Thomas, 2000 and Wang 2003a, b). 
On the basis of brief review of the literature and empirical papers published to date 
addressing this issue, and having as theoretical framework the hybrid theories, this paper 
aimed to test the statistical significance of rational and behavioral factors that have been 
submitted  by rational and behavioral approaches to explain the level of closed-end funds 
discounts (or premiums). That is, it intended to investigate which factors, commonly 
mentioned by the literature, can explain the existence and persistence of discounts, its cross-
sectional structure. This work is innovation, as noted above, by the fact that it does not 
employ a single and simple proxy of investor sentiment, as has generally been used by most 
authors (which often used as investor sentiment indicator the weighted average domestic 
closed-end funds discounts, in particular in research related to behavioral factors that 
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influence the discounts) but a composite index of investor sentiment. In this paper we used 
the composite index of investor sentiment suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which 
had not yet been tested, as far as we know, as an explanatory factor on the discounts level.  
The empirical results allow us to find evidence supporting the hybrid approach, particularly 
in the US closed-end funds market. The variables dividend yield, turnover ratio, restricted 
assets, investor sentiment and replication cost (limited to arbitration) showed statistical 
significance in cross-sectional multivariate linear regression analysis in the period 1994 to 
1998, considering a diversified sample of 346 US closed-end investment funds (it contained 
several categories of funds: stocks, bonds, tax-exempt Municipal bonds and international 
funds). These results confirm previous work carried out by Monte and Armada (2007, 2008), 
Monte (2008) as well as those of Gemmill and Thomas (2002) and Wang (2003a, b). 
As we have a relatively diverse sample, we proceeded to a discriminant analysis of data in 
order to address the other goal we set ourselves: if the closed-end funds can be distinguished 
taking into account the potential explanatory variables of the closed-end funds discount 
structure (or premiums) most commonly provided (as a result of the literature review) and 
which best discriminate the groups of funds. As mentioned earlier, this methodology has not 
yet been used in other studies by other authors on closed-end funds discounts. The results 
show that the so-called rational variables, dividend yield and management fee, as well as the 
behavioral variable replication costs (limits to arbitrage) are the variables that contribute most 
to the discriminant function between groups of equity and bond funds. Even though one 
cannot establish a direct link between the discriminant analysis and multivariate regressions 
results, it seems that these results suggest that the so-called rational and behavioral factors are 
relevant for explanation of US closed-end fund discounts and that structure factors may differ 
depending on the category of funds (have different weights), thus corroborating the 
arguments put forward by the hybrid framework.  
The results for the behavioral factors, whose regression coefficients were statistically 
significant but positive, contrary to expectations, in keeping with the arguments in favor of 
these factors suggest that it should continue to investigate these relations, finding more 
explicit and complete proxies, that combine direct methods (investors surveys) and indirect 
(indicators from the markets operation), for these variables, and in particular for the 
unobservable variable of investor sentiment. The variables concerning the portfolio 
composition and liquidity (turnover and restricted assets) also need to find better proxies. We 
may suggest, for example, the use the liquidity spread between fund shares and the 
underlying securities of fund's portfolio (due to budget constraints, these data were not 
obtained, so it was not possible to test this new variable). 
Another interesting question to consider in future is whether the discounts vary significantly 
depending on the fund category and what are the distinguishing characteristics (including the 
structure of factors explain the discounts level) of those funds that are at a premium, those 
who are moderate and higher discount level. 
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Annex 
Table
 
A.1: Hypothesis to test the factors that potentially explain the existence, persistence and 
variation of discounts (premiums) between closed-end funds. 
Explanatory Factors: Hypothesis to test: 
Dividend policy and potential tax 
liabilities 
 
H1: there is a negative relation between the level of closed-end fund 
discount and the dividend policy, i.e., when the dividend distribution 
raises (as given by payout ratio or as a proxy, the dividend yield), the 
discount level decreases. So, in terms of linear regression coefficient, 
0>β . 
Agency costs 
H2: there is a positive (negative) relation between the level of closed-end 
fund discount and management expenses (or management fee), i.e., as 
higher management expenses (or management fee) higher (lower) the 
discount (premium) level. This imply that, in terms of linear regression 
coefficient, we expect a negative coefficient: 0<β . 
Liquidity and turnover 
H3: there is a positive (negative) relation between the proportion of 
restricted assets and the level of discounts (premiums), i.e., higher the 
proportion of restricted assets higher (lower) the level of discounts 
(premiums). Though, in terms of linear regression: 0<β . 
H4: there is a positive relation between the turnover ratio and the level of 
discounts, i.e., higher turnover ratio higher (lower) the discount 
(premium) level. So, in terms of linear regression coefficient, we expect a 
negative coefficient, 0<β . 
Investor sentiment risk do and 
arbitrage limits 
 
H5: there is a positive relation between investor sentiment risk and the 
discount/premium level, i.e., higher fund sensitivity to investor sentiment 
higher (lower) the discount (premium) level. Thus, in terms of linear 
regression coefficient, 0<β . 
H6: there is a positive relation between discounts (premiums) and the 
difficulty of fund replication, i.e., higher the replication costs higher 
(lower) the discount level. Thus, in terms of linear regression coefficient, 
0<β . 
Other factors (size and age) 
H7: there is a negative relation between fund size and discounts 
(premiums), i.e., bigger funds should present lower (higher) level of 
discounts (premiums). Therefore, in terms of linear regression 
coefficient, 0>β . 
H8: There is a positive relation between fund age and discounts 
(premiums), i.e., younger funds should present lower (higher) level of 
discounts (premiums). Consequently, in terms of linear regression 
coefficient, 0<β . 
. 
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Table A.2. – Characterization of the sample of U.S. closed-end funds during the period 
1/01/1994 to 31/12/1998. 
Total Number of Funds 
BD-Weisenberger Sample 
662 346 
Classification by investment goal  (simplified) 
Muni Bond  
Fixed Income  
General equity 
Global & International 
Others 
Total % Total % 
250 
141 
36 
143 
92 
37.8% 
21.3% 
5.4% 
21.6% 
13.9% 
149 
93 
21 
58 
25 
43.1% 
26.9% 
6.1% 
16.8% 
7.2% 
Classification by category 
Fixed Income - taxable 
Fixed Income – tax-exempt 
General equity 
Global/International Equity 
Others 
248 
171 
61 
127 
55 
 
37.5% 
25.8% 
9.2% 
19.2% 
8.3% 
159 
92 
38 
52 
5 
46.0% 
26.6% 
11.0% 
15.0% 
1.4% 
Number of Closed-end funds IPO in (year): 
1994 44 -- 
1995 3 -- 
1996 30 -- 
1997 8 -- 
1998 33 -- 
Number of extinct funds due to open-ending operations in (year): 
1995 8 -- 
1996 4 -- 
1997 9 3 
1998 10 5 
For all funds in CDA/Weisenberger database, for 1994-1998 period and without adjustment to time series. 
Year Average Discount Median Variance standard desviation Max. Min. # Obs. 
1994 -3.87 -4.71 71.55 8.46 100.26 -37.14 26496 
1995 -7.21 -7.99 67.80 8.23 70.92 -38.96 26413 
1996 -6.67 -6.94 69.31 8.33 37.80 -42.56 26775 
1997 -5.19 -5.57 91.37 9.56 81.10 -42.48 26048 
1998 -3.05 -3.61 147.85 12.16 155.42 -42.48 26002 
1994-98 -4.40 -5.16 87.47 9.35 138.97 -34.91 88075 
source: based on CDA-Weisenberger data. 
 
